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CRIMINAL LAW: RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL-EXCLUSION OF THE PRESS.-Doe!
the exclusion of the public and press from a criminal trial give the newspapers a cause
of action under a statute calling for a public trial?'
During a recent trial in New York, 2 which attracted considerable public atten.
tion, the trial judge excluded all members of the public from the courtroom, excep
friends and relatives of the accused, and officers of the court. The appellants, a group
of newspapers, applied for a writ of prohibition. They claimed that the trial judge
had exceeded his jurisdiction in excluding the general public from the trial. The New
York Supreme Court, special term, denied the application, 3 and petitioners appealed
to the appellate division, which sustained the decision of the lower courts.4
Appellants brought this action on the theory that Judiciary Law, section 4, gave
them, and other members of the general public, a right t6 attend all sittings of every
court. The language of the statute is that "every citizen may freely attend" the sittings
of "every court within the state . . . except that in all proceedings and trials in cases
for divorce, seduction, abortion, rape, assault with intent to commit rape, sodomy,
bastardy, or filiation, the court may, in its own discretion, exclude therefrom all
persons who are not directly interested therein, excepting jurors, witnesses, and officers
of the court."
The case is unique in that a person other than the accused is bringing the action
under the Judiciary Law. A similar case arose in People ex rel. Gardiner v. Go f,5
where relator sought a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the judge of general
sessions to allow him to observe all proceedings that took place in court. Relator,
who was a district attorney, claimed he had a right to observe proceedings under
a code section that was very similar to the one in question. 6 The defendant judge
excluded all persons from the courtroom during the court's instructions to the jury,
except counsel and the assistant district attorney in charge of the case. In refusing
to grant the peremptory writ until questions of fact were decided, the court indicated
that the relator did not have a clear-cut right of action under the statute. This case can
be distinguished from the principal case in that the relator, as district attorney, had
a more direct interest in the court proceedings than the general public.
In sustaining the decision of the lower court in the principal case,7 the appellate
division of the Supreme Court said that section 4 of the Judiciary Law should be read
with section 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,' and section 12 of the Civil Rights
Law. 9 These sections state the rights of the accused in a criminal action as including
a speedy and public trial. The court said that the Judiciary Law, section 4, merely
defined what was meant by a public trial as set out in the other two sections.
'N. Y. Judiciary Law, § 4: "The sittings of every court within this state shall be public, and
every citizen may freely attend the same, except that in all proceedings and trials in cases for
divorce, seduction, abortion, rape, assault with intent to commit rape, sodomy, bastardy or filiation,
the court may, in its discretion, exclude therefrom all persons who are not directly interested
therein, excepting jurors, witnesses, and officers of the court."
'People v. Jelke (not appealed).
'United Press Associations v. Valente, Judge, 203 Misc. 220, 120 N.Y.S.2d 642 (1953).
'United Press Associations v. Valente, Judge, 281 App.Div. 395, 120 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1953).
'27 Misc. 331, 57 N.Y.Supp. 1106 (1899).
'N. Y. Code of Civ. Proc., § 5.
'See note 4 supra.
'N. Y. Code of Crim. Proc., § 8. "In a criminal action the defendant is entitled to a speedy
and public trial. . ....
'N. Y. Civil Rights Law, § 12. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused has a right to a speedy
and public trial ....
NOTES
However, appellants contended that this statute was enacted for the benefit of
the public, as is shown by amendments1O to the act which provide for certain excep-
tions to the general rule of a public trial. The exceptions gave the court discretion
to exclude the public in cases where sodomy was involved, but the exceptions did not
include cases of prostitution. Therefore, the appellants contended the court did not
have jurisdiction to exclude them from this case, prostitution being the primary issue
involved, under the theory of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
There have been a great number of decisions on the question whether a judge
can exercise discretion in clearing the courtroom in cases involving testimony that
may be harmful to public morals. The great majority clearly allow the judge to clear
the courtroom in such cases. However, the question has never before arisen whether
those persons excluded have such a right or interest as would allow them to bring
an action.
In Lee v. Brooklyn Union Pub. Co.,11 the court held that there is a public interest
in having proceedings of courts of justice made public for the greater security thus
given for the proper administration of justice. The court, in that case, then went on
to say that it was for this reason that section 4 of the Judiciary Law was provided.
The proceeding was one which the public had a right to hear, and the defendant
had the right, in the public interest, to report. However, in that case, defendant news-
paper was being sued for libel, and its defense was a right to report the facts of trials.'
The court failed to discuss whether Judiciary Law, section 4, would give the news-
paper or the public an enforceable right to attend proceedings of the court.
It is highly doubtful that the court would have gone so far as to say that
Judiciary Law, section 4, would give newspapers and the public a right of action in
cases where testimony injurious to public morals would be given. By a careful reading
of the statute, it appears very clear that the intention of the legislature was to protect
the accused by giving him a public trial. The amending of the statute to include
certain exceptions was for the benefit of the general public by preventing their morals
from being corrupted.
Before Judiciary Law, section 4, was amended to include sodomy as an exception
to the rule that all citizens are entitled to attend court sittings, the case of People v.
Hall 2 was decided. In that case, the defendants were tried for conspiracy to extort
money on the charge that one was guilty of sodomy. The judge cleared the courtroom
of all spectators, including reporters. Defendants appealed on grounds that they
did not have a public trial within the meaning of the statute, but the court held that
the courtroom could be cleared on the theory that public morals should be protected.
The court also said that the statute was for the benefit of the accused, but in such a
case as this, expulsion of spectators did not aid nor harm the defendants, since they
were still allowed to have their friends and relatives with them. The court did not
discuss the rights of the newspapers, because they failed to bring an action. However,
even if they had, it would be doubtful if the court would have ruled that the statute
gave them an enforceable right to observe court proceedings, because, as is said in the
case, the statute was for the benefit-of the accused, and the court would probably have
said that the right of the newspapers is no greater than that of the general public.
The court, in the Hall case, exercised its inherent power to exclude spectators,
despite the fact that the statute did not give it express power to exclude spectators in
cases of sodomy.
"
0N. Y. Laws 1945, c. 649, § 3.
21209 N.Y. 245, 103 N.E. 155 (1913).
"51 App.Div. 57, 64 N.Y.Supp. 433 (1900).
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In State v. Smith,' 3 the court also held that a public trial is for the sole benefit c
the accused, so that not every person who sees fit can be permitted to attend in all case
The court went on to say that it can, at its own discretion, order spectators excludei
from the courtroom, provided that the defendant is safeguarded in his right to a publi
trial.
On the basis of the above cases, it is fair to conclude that courts have discretionar
power to exclude spectators from the courtroom in trials that involve public morals
However, this discretion is limited to excluding only the general public, and thi
exclusion of friends and relatives of the accused is deemed to be an abuse of thi
court's discretion. 1 4
However, the question whether the appellants in the principal case are given
right of action under the Judiciary Law, section 4, still remains. In an oft-quotec
statement, it is said that by a public trial is "not meant that every person who sees fi
shall in all cases be permitted to attend criminal trials."' 5 Since the statute is solel3
for the benefit of the accused, if the court errs in excluding the public, only th(
defendant may appeal, not a member of the general public.
Such a construction of the statute would not be violative of the New Yor
constitution,1 6 as was shown in the recent case of Danziger v. Hearst Corp.'7 In thai
case the defendant newspaper reported matters pertaining to a divorce, althougl
information was obtained through court records of divorce proceedings, which, undei
the Rules of Civil Practice, Rule 278, were to be available only to the parties. ThE
court held, in deciding against the defendant, that prohibiting newspapers and others
from examining divorce proceedings is not an unconstitutional restriction on freedom
of the press, since freedom of the press is limited by the police power of the state
to protect the health, safety, and morals of the community.
England has also seen fit to enact statutes restricting newspapers from reporting
certain proceedings.' 8 As one English judge said, "The liberty of the press is no
greater or no less than the liberty of every subject of the Queen."' 9
It appears, from the decision of the principal case, that appellants had very little
on which to base their claim. A case such as Davis v. U. S.20 would have been of little
aid to them. There, everyone was barred from the trial except reporters, counsel,
relatives, and a few friends of the court officers. The court held that this deprived the
defendant of a public trial, but this case can be distinguished from the appellant's case
in that public morals were not involved in the case.
The appellants might have contended that the press was denied access to the
court for the protection of the morals of the general public, rather than for the purpose
of promoting justice. It is submitted that the reason given by the court appears to
protect morals, and thus is one of pure censorship. The court might have fortified its
reasoning by saying that justice would better be served if the names of those involved
did not become public property. Men might be improperly charged.
90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110 (1936).
"In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682, where court held petitioner's right to
a public trial included friends and relatives in the courtroom with him.
"1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 647 (8th ed. 1927).
"McKINNEY, N. Y. CONST., Art. 1, § 8, "... no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge
the liberty of speech or the press."
"1304 N.Y. 244, 107 N.E.2d 62 (1952).
"Children's and Young Persons' Act § 49 (1) (1933).
"Rex v. Gray, [1900] 2 Q.B. 36, 40.
20247 Fed. 394 (8th Cir. 1917), L.R.A. 1918C, 1164.
